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NOTES
OIL AND GAS-DEDUCTIONS UNDER A PROCEEDS ROYALTY
LEASE-Arkansas Puts the Pressure on Lessee. Hanna Oil & Gas
Company v. Taylor, 297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 563 (1988).
On May 5, 1975,1 Hanna Oil and Gas Company (lessee) executed
an oil and gas lease with David Taylor (lessor). Hanna pooled the 80
acre Taylor lease with other land to form a 640 acre production unit.
In July 1976 Hanna completed a producing natural gas well on the
lease. Pursuant to a gas purchase contract between Hanna and Ar-
kansas Louisiana Gas Company (Arkla), Hanna sold gas produced
from the well to Arkla upon delivery into its pipeline. The Arkla
contract required Hanna to deliver the gas at a pressure of 500
pounds per square inch.2
For eight years the well produced gas at sufficient pressure so
that no compression was necessary for delivery into Arkla's pipeline.
Beginning in April 1984, reservoir pressure fell below 500 pounds per
square inch due to the withdrawal of gas. Hanna then began com-
pressing gas produced at the well to deliver it at the required pres-
sure.3 However, lessee did not deduct compression costs from the
royalty paid to lessor until October 1986. On May 5, 1987, Taylor
filed suit in chancery court challenging the deduction of compression
costs.
The lease did not specifically mention compression costs. 4 The
applicable royalty clause in the lease contained the following lan-
guage: "Lessee shall pay Lessor one-eighth of the proceeds received
by Lessee at the well for all gas (including all substances contained in
1. Specific date was taken from the lease. See infra note 4.
2. Section 8 of the contract gave Arkla the right to require that gas be delivered at con-
tract pressure (500 pounds per square inch). It further provided that Arkla could, but was not
obligated to, compress the gas itself and deduct compression costs from the purchase price.
Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 563
(1988).
3. 297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 563. Arkla elected not to provide for compression. Thus,
under the contract, Hanna had to compress the gas to make it salable. Id.
4. The lease form was a standard oil and gas lease, "AAPL FORM 680" (American
Association of Petroleum Landmen Approved Form No. 680), with no significant alterations
(copy supplied by Dorsey Ryan, attorney for appellant).
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such gas) produced from the leased premises and sold by Lessee." 5
The Franklin County Chancery Court, Charleston District, ruled
that the lessee was not entitled to deduct a pro rata share of compres-
sion costs from royalty payments. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed, holding that a lessee may not deduct compression costs from
royalty payments when an oil and gas lease contains a proceeds roy-
alty clause such as this. Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 297 Ark. 80,
759 S.W.2d 563 (1988).
Early oil producers considered natural gas as a waste by-product
of oil production.6 Around the 1930s, city and community systems
began utilizing natural gas as an efficient and inexpensive heating fuel,
but the use was primarily local in nature.7 It was during this time
period that the Arkansas General Assembly recognized the value of
natural gas resources and their limited supply by passing a "conserva-
tion statute" to prevent the waste of oil and natural gas resources. s
The increased demand for petroleum products during World War II
induced the creation of pipeline systems from production areas to
population centers. 9 During the postwar era these pipeline systems
were converted to the private sector and formed the basis for a com-
plex interstate system to transport natural gas to populated areas for
use as a home heating and industrial fuel."°
In North Arkansas until about 1981 there existed only one pur-
chaser, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (Arkla), with pipelines
5. See supra note 4. The royalty clause is contained in Paragraph 4 of AAPL Form 680.
Following the language construed by the court, the lease also contains the following sentence:
"If such gas is used by Lessee off the leased premises or used by Lessee for the manufacture of
casinghead gasoline or other products, Lessee shall pay Lessor one-eighth of the prevailing
market price at the well for the gas so used." Id.
6. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). In the early
days, gas produced as a by-product of oil production was often simply burned off or "flared."
Id.
[A]t one time, one could drive for many miles at night through the East Texas Oil
Field without turning on the lights of one's vehicle. From the air, West Texas was




8. 1939 Ark. Acts 105 (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-72-101 to 110 (1987).
The Act defines "waste" as including "[tihe inefficient.., operating, or producing of any oil or
gas well or wells in a manner which results, or tends to result, in reducing the quantity of oil or
gas ultimately to be recovered from any pool in this state." Id. § 15-72-102(9)(A).
9. 571 S.W.2d at 352.
10. Id.
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that transported gas out of the area. " Most gas purchase contracts in
that area gave Arkla, the purchaser, the right to compress gas (if nec-
essary to meet pipeline pressure requirements) and deduct compres-
sion costs from the price paid to the producer.' 2 However, because of
a general oversupply of gas during the last few years, purchasers often
opt not to compress gas in order to purchase it. 13 Thus, the changing
gas economy has left producers (lessees) with the choice of com-
pressing the gas themselves or leaving it in the ground.' 4
In Arkansas, an oil and gas lease gives the lessee an option to
explore and develop the mineral potential of a tract of land. 5 The
primary consideration for the landowner's (lessor's) granting this op-
tion is the potential for "risk-free riches in the form of royalty."' 6
This lease relationship creates an inherent conflict between lessor and
lessee. The lessee must pay for exploration and development, while
the "lessor's royalty is calculated as a 'cost-free' share of
production.' 17
It is well settled that the lessee alone must bear the costs of actual
production, including exploration costs, costs of bringing the gas to
11. Affidavit of William R. Walker, President of Stephens Production Company, quoted
in Brief for Appellant at 7, Hanna, 297 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 563.
12. Id. Arkla's purchase contract with Hanna Oil & Gas Company contained such a
clause. See supra note 2.
13. Affidavit of William R. Walker, supra note 11. See also Hanna, 297 Ark. at 84-85,
759 S.W.2d at 566 (Hays, J., dissenting).
14. Hanna, 297 Ark. at 84-85, 759 S.W.2d at 566 (Hays, J., dissenting).
15. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas (Chapter IV), 10 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 5 (1987-88) [hereinafter Wright IV]. In Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637
S.W.2d 581 (1982), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated the questionable conclusion that an
Arkansas gas lease constitutes a present sale of all the gas in place. Wright, The Arkansas Law
of Oil and Gas (Chapter I), 9 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 223, 224-25 (1986-87) [hereinafter
Wright I]. This statement contradicts Arkansas precedent and probably resulted from the
court's confusion of the present sale of lessor's interest with the present sale of all gas in place.
Note, Hillard v. Stephens: Interpretation of Market Price Royalty Provisions in Natural Gas
Leases, 36 ARK. L. REV. 312, 322 (1982).
16. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 447 (1987). The lessor
may also receive consideration in the form of a bonus payment and delay rentals as provided in
the lease, but these payments are usually small in comparison to royalties derived from a
producing well. Id.; Wright IV, supra note 15, at 5.
17. Pierce, supra note 16, at 458. Professor Kuntz states:
The cause of the conflict in the interests of the lessor and lessee is very simple. The
lessee must bear the cost of any operation on the leased premises, whether such oper-
ation is in exploration, development, or production; while the lessor derives his bene-
fit from production, free and clear of all costs. It is true that any activity in the
exploration, development, and operation of the leased premises involves a risk of loss
to both lessor and lessee, but the risk of loss to which the lessor is exposed is negligi-
ble in comparison to the risk undertaken by the lessee.
5 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 54.2, at 1-2 (1978).
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the surface, and costs of activities normally conducted at the well-
head.i" Likewise, it is generally accepted that both lessor and lessee
are to share post-production costs,1 9 although there is some question
as to where the dividing line should be drawn.2" Post-production ex-
penses borne proportionately by lessor and lessee normally include
transportation costs, pipeline expenses, gross production and sever-
ance taxes, and expenses of making the product salable (e.g.,
dehydration). 2'
There is a definite split of authority as to whether compression
costs are production costs to be borne solely by the lessee/producer or
marketing expenses to be proportionately shared by lessor and
lessee.22 An apparent majority of authorities and jurisdictions agree
that compression costs are post-production expenses or marketing
costs which should be shared by the lessor/royalty-owner. 23 In Mar-
tin v. Glass24 the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas concluded that compression is a "separate and
independent step, once or more removed from production, and as
18. Wright IV, supra note 15, at 12-13; 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 17, § 40.5 (1967); H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 856-57 (7th ed. 1987); Altman &
Lindberg, Oil and Gas: Non-Operating Oil and Gas Interests' Liability for Post-Production
Costs and Expenses, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 363, 365 (1972); Note, Costs Deductible by the Lessee in
Accounting to Royalty Owners for Production of Oil or Gas, 46 LA. L. REV. 895, 898-99 (1986).
Professor Williams includes the following in "costs of production": "(1) Costs of geophysical
surveys, (2) Drilling costs, (3) Tangible and intangible costs incurred in testing, completing, or
reworking a well, including the cost of installing the Christmas tree, (4) Secondary recovery
costs." 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 645.1 (1988).
19. 3 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, § 645.2, at 596-607 and cases cited therein; Altman &
Lindberg, supra note 18; H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 18; Note, supra note 18; see
also Siefkin, Rights of Lessor and Lessee with Respect to Sale of Gas and as to Gas Royalty
Provisions, 4 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 181 (1953). Contra M. MERRILL, COVENANTS
IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 85 (1940). Dr. Merrill states: "No part of the costs of
marketing or of preparation for sale is chargeable to the lessor." Id. at 214-15.
20. Professor Kuntz opines that the production function extends until a marketable prod-
uct has been obtained, but after the product has been rendered marketable, further expenses of
improving or transporting the product should be shared by lessor and lessee. 3 E. KUNTZ,
supra note 17, § 40.5, at 322-55. But see 3 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, § 645.2, at 602 ("Ex-
penses of treatment required to make the mineral product salable" are costs subsequent to
production.).
21. See supra notes 19-20.
22. Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 368.
23. 3 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, § 645.2, at 596-607; 3A W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS § 589 (1958 & Supp. 1989); Note, supra note 18, at 906-07; see, e.g., Scott Paper
Co. v. Taslog, Inc., 638 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D.
Tex. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1984); Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466 (W.D.
Okla. 1963); Merritt v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
Parker v. TXO Production Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
24. 571 F. Supp. 1406.
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such is a post-production expense, and the lessee is entitled to a pro
rata reimbursement." 25 Some authorities have characterized com-
pression costs as a specific form of transportation costs or their theo-
retical equivalent.26 Altman and Lindberg submit that there is no
rational basis for allowing deduction from royalty payments of pipe-
line or other transportation costs and yet deny lessee the right to de-
duct other marketing expenses such as compression costs.2 7 Siefkin
pointedly states:
Here is a well and here is gas at the well head. At this time and
place we evaluate that gas for purposes of computing royalty. It is
worth what it will bring at that point in its natural state, no more,
no less .... If it cannot be sold at the well because of its inferior
quality, how can the lessee's duty to 'market' be transposed into a
duty to render the gas more valuable than it actually is, all at his
expense? ... To my mind it is at least equally persuasive to insist
that the duty to market is confined to the product in the state in
which it is produced at the well, and does not include any duty, at
the lessee's sole expense, to increase its value by processing, any
more than it includes a duty to transport it free of charge to distant
markets.28
A minority of authorities and jurisdictions support the proposi-
tion that compression costs are expenses for which the lessee alone
should pay.29 Dr. Merrill states: "No part of the costs of marketing
or of preparation for sale is chargeable to the lessor. This is supported
by the general current of authority."3 However, Dr. Merrill's claim
that his view is supported by the "general current of authority" is
persuasively challenged by Altman and Lindberg.3 Furthermore, the
two Kansas cases which relied on Dr. Merrill's views, Gilmore v. Su-
25. Id. at 1416.
26. Note, supra note 18, at 906.
27. Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 368-69.
28. Siefkin, supra note 19, at 200-01.
29. M. MERRILL, supra note 19; see, e.g., California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 192 Kan. 388, 388 P.2d 602 (1964); Schupbach v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., 193 Kan. 401, 394 P.2d 1 (1964); cf. West v. Alpar Resources, Inc., 298
N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1980) (Lessee was not allowed to deduct costs of removing hydrogen sulfide
from sour gas to make it marketable, under a "proceeds of sale" royalty clause. The court
considered the removal costs as production costs.); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 261
Ky. 840, 88 S.W.2d 989 (1935) (see infra note 51 and accompanying text). Compare 3 E.
KUNTZ, supra note 17, § 40.5 (1967). Presumably, Professor Kuntz would deny deduction of
compression costs if compression was necessary to render the gas marketable, but allow deduc-
tion of costs of compressing gas to merely increase its value. Id.; see supra note 20.
30. M. MERRILL, supra note 19, § 85, at 214-15.
31. Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 370-80.
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perior Oil Co. 32 and Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co.,33 have been
criticized as contrary to law and conflicting with Kansas precedent.34
Arkansas considered the issue of the deductibility of transporta-
tion costs before computing royalty payments in Clear Creek Oil &
Gas Co. v. Bushmaier.35 The lease construed in Bushmaier based roy-
alty payments upon "market price of royalty gas at the wells."' 36 Be-
cause there was no market at the well, the lessee transported gas to
industrial customers in Van Buren and Ft. Smith several miles away.
The court held that the lessee was entitled to deduct costs from the
lessor's royalties for the cost of transportation to carry the gas to the
nearest available market.37
In Parnell, Inc. v. Giller 31 the Arkansas Supreme Court con-
strued a royalty clause in a typical oil and gas lease used as a lease
form for commercial brine production. For brine sold at the well,
royalty was to be based upon the "amount realized," but for brine
sold or used off the premises, royalty was to be based upon the "mar-
ket value at the well."' 39 The brine was sold to a chemical company
pursuant to a contract which required Parnell (lessee) to deliver raw
brine to the plant for bromine extraction and dispose of the spent
brine." Citing Bushmaier, the court allowed the lessee to deduct
pipeline expenses and disposal costs because both services were "es-
sential to and peculiar to the marketing of the product itself."'"
In Hillard v. Stephens42 the Arkansas Supreme Court construed
a gas lease provision whereby royalty was to be based on the "prevail-
ing market price at [the] well."'4 3 The issue was whether this provi-
sion meant that royalty was to be computed from current fluctuating
32. 192 Kan. 388, 388 P.2d 602 (1964).
33. 193 Kan. 401, 394 P.2d 1 (1964).
34. Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 376-79. In reference to the Gilmore decision,
Summers states: "Though this text was cited, it is believed the case is contrary to the majority
rule and lays upon the lessee a financial burden not necessarily a part of the duty to market."
3A W. SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 589, at 20 n.18 (Supp. 1989). Likewise, the A.B.A. Section
of Mineral and Natural Resources Law, 1964 COMMITTEE REP. 69 states: "This case appears
to be contrary to the great weight of opinion, and in fact, cannot be reconciled with established
precedent in the State of Kansas." Id.
35. 165 Ark. 303, 264 S.W. 830 (1924).
36. Id. at 307, 264 S.W. at 832.
37. Id.
38. 237 Ark. 267, 372 S.W.2d 627 (1963).
39. Id. at 268, 372 S.W.2d at 628.
40. Id., 372 S.W.2d at 627.
41. Id. at 269, 372 S.W.2d at 628.
42. 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).
43. Id. at 547, 637 S.W.2d at 582 (emphasis omitted).
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prices or frozen at the price in the lessee/producer's long-term
purchase contract with Arkla." The court in Hillard noted that a
lessee/producer has an implied immediate duty to market the gas pro-
duced.45 The court also recognized the importance of long-term gas
purchase contracts in discharging lessee's duty to market. Relying
heavily on the Oklahoma case of Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey,46
the Arkansas court adopted a rule favoring the lessee's interest:
when a producer's lease calls for a royalty on gas based on the
market price at the well and the producer enters into an arm's-
length, good faith gas purchase contract with the best price and
term available to the producer at the time, that price is the 'market
price' and will discharge the producer's gas royalty obligation
[even if the current market price is higher]. 4
The sole issue considered by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Hanna, was whether Hanna Oil and Gas Company as lessee/pro-
ducer was entitled to deduct a pro rata share of its compression costs
from David Taylor's (lessor's) royalties.48 The applicable royalty
clause reads as follows: "Lessee shall pay Lessor one-eighth of the
proceeds received by Lessee at the well for all gas (including all sub-
stances contained in such gas) produced from the leased premises and
sold by Lessee." 49
The majority first focused on the plain meaning of the word
"proceeds" in the royalty clause. Citing the Kentucky case of War-
field Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 50 the court stated that " 'proceeds' gen-
erally means total proceeds" unless an agreement provides
otherwise.5" The court added that this interpretation was consistent
44. Id. at 549-50, 637 S.W.2d at 583.
45. Id. at 550; see Note, supra note 15; Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas (Chap-
ter V), 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 699, 716-17 (1987-88).
46. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
47. 276 Ark. at 551, 637 S.W.2d at 584 (quoting Tara, 630 P.2d at 1273).
48. 297 Ark. at 80, 759 S.W.2d at 564.
49. Id. at 81, 759 S.W.2d at 564; see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50. 261 Ky. 840, 88 S.W.2d 989 (1935).
51. 297 Ark. at 81, 759 S.W.2d at 564-65. It is questionable that the decision in Warfield
actually supports the majority's opinion in Hanna. In Warfield the lessor refused to accept
royalty deductions for transportation costs. The Kentucky court's reference to "proceeds"
meaning "total proceeds" was apparently only dictum because the court went on to hold:
Nothing was said in the lease about a sale elsewhere and this lease must be held to
mean one-eighth of the gross proceeds of a sale of the gas at the well side, and that is
all for which defendant must account even though it may market the gas elsewhere
and get a much greater sum for it.
261 Ky. at 844, 88 S.W.2d at 992 (emphasis added). One writer has gone as far as stating that
the general current of authority considers the terms "proceeds" and "net proceeds" as synony-
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with the dictionary definition of "proceeds." 52 Thus, the majority ex-
cised the word "proceeds" from the royalty clause, and on the basis of
its common meaning, held that the lessee was not entitled to deduct
compression costs. Furthermore, the court stated: "If it had been
their intention to do so, they would have made some reference to
costs, or 'net' proceeds."5 3
Next, the majority recited the rule that "[a]mbiguities in an oil
and gas lease should be construed in favor of the lessor and against
the lessee." 54 The court did not find the lease provision to be ambigu-
ous.55 But, the implication is that had the court found the clause am-
biguous the result would have been the same.
Finally, the court considered the parties' construction of the
agreement by the parties. The fact that Hanna began compressing gas
in April 1984 but did not deduct compression costs from royalty pay-
ments until October 1986 (two and one-half years later) was "perhaps
the most compelling support for [the court's] conclusion that the
compression costs are not deductible."5 6
Justice Hays filed a dissenting opinion stressing that the court
should construe the royalty clause as a whole, and consider the lease
within the proper context of the oil and gas industry. First, Justice
Hays observed that the majority focuses on the plain meaning of the
word "proceeds," while ignoring the equally crucial term "at the
well."51 7 Justice Hays stated: "The term 'at the well' is a term of art
describing the place where the royalty is calculated. Here, due to the
low pressure of the gas, there would be no sales at the well, and hence
no royalties, but for the compression. 51 8
mous. Note, supra note 18, at 897. More properly stated, authorities generally agree that
when proceeds are to be determined at the well, costs incurred beyond the wellhead are deduct-
ible under a "proceeds" royalty provision. 3 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, §§ 645.2-646.1, at
596-611.
52. 297 Ark. at 81, 759 S.W.2d at 565.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 82, 759 S.W.2d at 565 (citing Bodcaw Oil Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 217 Ark.
50, 61, 228 S.W.2d 626, 633 (1950)).
55. Id.
56. Id. The court cited Skaggs v. Heard, 172 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Tex. 1959), for the
proposition that the construction placed upon an agreement by the parties is often decisive in
construing an instrument.
57. 297 Ark. at 82, 759 S.W.2d at 565 (Hays, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 83, 759 S.W.2d at 565. This view is supported by Professor Williams who
explains that the term "at the well" describes the place at which the royalty-owner's share of
production (or the proceeds thereof) must be delivered "free of cost." Furthermore, Professor
Williams states that construction problems with "proceeds" royalty clauses should occur only
when there is no "clear specification as to whether proceeds 'at the well' or proceeds 'at the
place of sale' is meant." 3 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, §§ 645.2-646.1, at 596-611.
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Second, Justice Hays discussed the case of Hillard v. Stephens, 9
which the majority did not address. In Hillard the court held that a
lessee/producer has an immediate duty to market gas produced. The
court also encouraged long-term gas purchase contracts as a means of
adhering to that duty.6° However, in this case, because compression
was necessary to meet contract requirements, Justice Hays reasoned
that the majority opinion penalizes the lessee for his diligence in se-
curing long-term purchase contracts. "Not only does the majority
opinion place financial impediments towards the lessee fulfilling this
marketing duty, but the lessee's implied duty to market is transposed
into a duty to render the gas more valuable than it actually is. ' '6'
Third, Justice Hays opined that Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v.
Bushmaier62 supports the deductibility of compression costs. 63 The
rationale for this conclusion is that compression costs and transporta-
tion costs are both post-production expenses. In fact, compression
and transportation are theoretical equivalents in that both are
''merely logistical methods by which the gap between production and
pipeline are transcended, regardless of whether such gap is measured
in inches or miles." 6 Although the court in Bushmaier was constru-
ing a "market price" royalty clause, Justice Hays asserted that the
terms "market price," "market value," and "proceeds" merely set the
basis from which the royalty is calculated.65 Thus, in this case, where
the issue is what expenses the lessee may deduct from the basis, the
distinction is irrelevant.66
Finally, Justice Hays pointed out that the construction placed
upon the terms by the parties was primarily a function of the dynamic
economics of the gas industry, not an affirmative choice on the part of
the lessee. When gas was in short supply and/or the price was high,
gas purchasers compressed the gas themselves, if necessary, and de-
ducted a portion of the price paid to the supplier. However, gas pur-
chasers now opt not to compress the gas due to an oversupply.67
Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the majority opinion with the fact
that if Arkla had opted to compress the gas itself, the lessor would
59. 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).
60. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
61. 297 Ark. at 83, 759 S.W.2d at 566 (Hays, J., dissenting).
62. 165 Ark. 303, 264 S.W. 830 (1924).
63. See supra notes 25-26, 34-36 and accompanying text.




67. Id. at 84-85, 759 S.W.2d at 566. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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have had no choice but to share proportionately in the cost of
compression.
The Hanna decision introduces a certain amount of confusion
into royalty provisions. Because compression costs are normally con-
sidered post-production expenses, there is now no clear division in
Arkansas between costs that should be borne solely by the lessor and
those that should be shared pro rata by the lessor and lessee. For
example, a strict interpretation of the Hanna opinion suggests that
expenses of treatment required to make a mineral product salable,
such as dehydration, would not be deductible under some circum-
stances. Until the Arkansas Supreme Court establishes a clear divi-
sion between production expenses and post-production expenses, any
cost incurred between the wellhead and delivery to the purchaser may
be open to dispute.
On the other hand, one might conclude that Hanna sets only a
narrow precedent due to the emphasis the majority apparently placed
on the parties' construction of the lease. If the parties' construction
was truly the decisive factor, there may be very few instances for the
application of Hanna in the future. Nevertheless, lessees would be
well-advised to promptly deduct from royalty payments any costs that
conceivably may be deductible. Of course, the preferred solution to
this problem is for the lease to state explicitly those costs which are to
be shared pro rata by lessor and lessee.68
In the long run, the Hanna decision may be of little benefit to
royalty-owners. If the lessee bears all of the compression expenses, it
follows that the profitable limit of the wells will be arrived at sooner.69
In order to keep an Arkansas gas lease alive pursuant to the standard
habendum clause, there must be "production in paying quantities"
(i.e., production profitable to the lessee).7° If the well is prematurely
68. An example of such a royalty provision is that contained in TXO Production Corp.
Form 235 (Rev. 12/88) which states in paragraph 4: "Lessee shall pay . . . to Lessor one-
eighth of the net proceeds realized by Lessee for all gas... produced from the leased premises
and sold by Lessee, less Lessor's proportionate share of taxes and all costs incurred by Lessee
in delivering, processing, compressing or otherwise making such gas or other substances mer-
chantable or enhancing the marketing thereof."
69. Altman & Lindberg, supra note 18, at 365 n.10.
70. Wright IV, supra note 15, at 26; Turner v. Reynolds Metal Co., 290 Ark. 481, 721
S.W.2d 626 (1986). But cf Perry v. Nicor Exploration, Inc., 293 Ark. 417, 738 S.W.2d 414
(1987), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court held that when an oil and gas lease is pooled
with other leases to form a production unit, the profitability of the unit as a whole is the
determinative factor. See Note, Perry Y. Nicor Exploration, Inc.: Split Stream Sales and Paying
Quantities, 42 ARK. L. REV. 155 (1989) for a discussion of the import of the Perry decision.
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abandoned, has the royalty-owner's interest been advanced?
G. Alan Perkins

